Two detailed public reports on the Australian Federal Government's ClusteredAgency Information Technology Outsourcing Initiative were published recently.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of what makes Information technology (IT) outsourcing successful is one of the most important topics in IT management today. A recent survey of IT Outsourcing practices in Australia [Cullen et al. 2001 reports that 97% of 235 large Australian organizations were outsourcing at least some of their IT service provision. On average, those organizations were spending almost 30% of their IT budgets on outsourcing. Worldwide, Lacity and Willcocks [2001] suggest that total IT outsourcing expenditure is now in excess of US$100 billion per annum, and rising. It is these huge expenditures on outsourcing that make it so important to understand which practices work and which do not.
In the last decade, much has been learnt about the factors that affect success with IT outsourcing. After the early reports enthusing about the benefits of IT outsourcing at Kodak [Applegate and Montealegre 1991] , General Dynamics [Seger and McFarlan 1993] , and Xerox [Davis and Applegate 1995] , researchers such as Lacity [1992] , Lacity and Hirschheim [1993, 1995] , Huber [1993] , Willcocks and Fitzgerald [1994] , and McFarlan and Nolan [1995] began in-depth studies of which practices work and which do not. In addition, by 1995, when Strassman [1995] published his damning conclusion that IT outsourcing was "a game for losers", it was clear that outsourcing was a complex approach to IT service provision that required careful management from both client and vendor organizations, and did not always deliver the expected benefits. By 1997, Willcocks and Lacity [1998] were able to assemble a set of papers, most written in 1995-96, from fourteen groups of researchers who had all contributed to our understanding of what worked and what did not. Willcocks and Lacity note in their introduction [pp.12-13] that the IT outsourcing market at that time was still relatively immature, and that many client organizations lacked sufficient experience to work effectively with IT outsourcing vendors.
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In the latter part of the decade the causes of success and failure became clearer as further research was published [Ang and Straub 1998 , Feeny and Willcocks 1998 , Hu et al. 1997 ], so that by the year 2000, Lacity and Willcocks [2001] were able to offer a list of "proven practices" for IT outsourcing success. Their "proven practices", drawn from their detailed analysis of 116 large IT "sourcing decisions" over the previous decade include the following [p.xiii]:
(1) the use of a selective sourcing strategy rather than all-or-none outsourcing strategies, (2) identifying core IT capabilities to keep in-house (see the nine "core capabilities" for successful IT management in Feeny and Willcocks [1998] and Chapter 7 in Lacity and Willcocks [2001] ), (3) identifying non-core IT capabilities for potential outsourcing, (4) conducting a rigorous evaluation of market options and supplier offerings, (5) clearly defining IT outsourcing expectations and mitigating risk in a contract, and (6) implementing post-contract management processes and structures to enable supplier success.
In addition to endorsing the relatively greater success of selective over total outsourcing 1 , Sambamurthy et al. [2001, p.299] suggest that IT outsourcing is also more likely to be successful if it is focused on activities where external providers:
(7) supply expertise that is currently lacking, (8) can capitalize on economies of scale, and/or (9) take on responsibilities not considered critical to the customer organization.
Finally, Cullen [1997] argues strongly for:
5
(10) the use of regularly-renegotiated service level agreements (e.g., monthly) as the basis for sound ongoing management of IT outsourcing relationships.
These "ten commandments" constitute some of the world's best available advice or theory about how to achieve successful outcomes from IT outsourcing.
Seemingly flying in the face of these ten commandments, in January 2001 the Australian Federal Government completed what can best be described as a bold four-year field experiment in total IT outsourcing. The innovation in the experiment involved grouping government agencies (mainly departments) into clusters and mandating that they outsource all their IT services. The experiment directly affected thousands of peoples' jobs, and left the Australian government with five five-year IT Outsourcing contracts worth a total of A$1.2 billion (approx.
US$600 million) that will affect government IT service provision for many years to come. clustered-agency total IT outsourcing, it seems safe to predict that many of the remaining Heads of agencies will now chose not to outsource all IT service provision, if they outsource at all.
A lot of heat and anguish was generated by the events described in this paper.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe the experiment as accurately, fairly, and unemotionally as possible, relying only on documented facts to draw four important lessons. The lessons are as follows:
1. Don't cluster. The apparent economies of scale that can be gained by grouping agencies into clusters are overwhelmed by the increased coordination costs required to manage the clusters. This lesson is particularly true for total outsourcing, which involves a myriad of IT services. 4. Cost savings through outsourcing are surprisingly hard to measure and may be unattainable. Although the 1997-98 federal budget talks of cost savings of $100M p.a., representing 15% of the government's total IT expenditure, cost savings are actually very hard to achieve. It seems likely that three out of four tenders discussed in this paper will not achieve cost savings.
Gaining commitment of all
The above lessons were learnt at considerable cost. If the government had known in 1997 what it knows now, it is fair to say that it would have not have embarked on the experiment described in this paper. Report 1998 Report /99 (1999 . It also appears in the above-mentioned OIS Newsletter, page 4. 4 The privatization-minded Howard Government was elected into office on 4 March, 1996. To gain full advantages from economies of scale, a number of large and small government agencies (e.g., two large and four small departments) were to be formed into clusters that were to purchase all their IT services from a single prime contractor. A total of eleven clusters or groups were to be formed. The initial plan was that all eleven contracts would be in place by June 1999 [ANAO 2000 . According to the 1997-98 budget [Costello, May 1997] Humphrey Report [2000] was released. That report, which is also available on the web, is the second key source of detailed information for this paper.
II. THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT IT OUTSOURCING INITIATIVE
In essence, the Humphry report recommended that the government's mandated 
III. LESSONS LEARNT ABOUT CLUSTERED-AGENCY IT OUTSOURCING LESSON 1: DON'T CLUSTER.
The idea for clustering seems to have come from the outsourcing vendors in the [ANAO 2000, para 3] .
However, experience now shows that any economies of scale attainable through clustering were more than offset by the increased coordination costs required to manage heterogeneous IT service provision through clusters 
LESSON 2: GAINING COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IS ESSENTIAL
The key lesson that Independent reviewer Humphry seems to have learnt from the four-year Initiative is that it is imperative to gain commitment from the majority of the people involved:
"Fundamental to an understanding of transition is that it is not merely a technology issue. The implementation project at its heart is about the management of human resources and cultural change, of which technology is an important but not dominant element." [Humphry 2000, p.11] Commitment matters in at least two ways. First, the government failed to achieve commitment to the project from senior management in its various agencies.
Second, the government's decision to outsource IT created a host of human [Humphry 2000, p.11] With respect to human resource (HR) issues, outsourcing created the usual set of problems for employees, vendors, and clients (the government agencies).
From the individual employees' points of view, the whole experience was very [ANAO 2000 p.191, footnote 193] Clearly, participant commitment was lacking in the government's IT Outsourcing Initiative. Senior agency management did not back the Initiative, which probably doomed it from the start. In addition, the government's high-handed approach to the Initiative appears to have caused many of its former IT employees to look for other employment or retire. This outcome resulted in a loss of organizational knowledge that must have caused great difficulties for the outsourcing vendors.
LESSON 3: MAKING THE TRANSITION TO TOTAL OUTSOURCING IS HARD.
As noted earlier, by 1997 the world knew a lot about IT outsourcing. To ensure success, the government paid top dollar for the best advice. It employed US law firm Shaw Pittman for strategic advice and contract negotiation 11 . The government also chose to work with the world's most experienced outsourcing vendors (including IBM GSA, CSC, and EDS). Given all this access to highpowered knowledge and experience, the process of transitioning from internal to The Australian Federal Government's Clustered-Agency IT Outsourcing Experiment by P. Seddon. external service provision should have been expected to run reasonably smoothly.
Yet the transition was not smooth. The Auditor-General's report is replete with details of difficulties encountered by all three Groups in thrashing out contracts, defining service levels, measuring service levels, managing external service providers, providing appropriately-substantiated invoices, agreeing on credits for failure to meet agreed service levels, and resolving disagreements over disputed invoices. In some cases, service levels dropped significantly:
"In August 1999, the Group 5 Management Committee advised the ESP that the service difficulties represented a significant erosion over the services delivered in agencies prior to handover. Although acknowledging that the ESP was attempting to fix the problems, the Group wished to put on record that the service problems were having a real and significant impact on business in Group 5 agencies, and seriously affecting
productivity." [ANAO 2000 para 8.12] In other cases, problems emerged with procedural matters such as invoicing and failure to deliver promised performance reviews. [Humphry 2000, p.11] In short, making the transition from internal to external IT service provision is hard, particularly in total outsourcing deals such as these. Again, this is not a new lesson. Every organization that outsourced had to deal with transition problems. What is surprising is that even with access to so much expert advice on ways of handling the transition, both the government and vendor firms found these particular transitions so difficult. Some of the difficulties were clearly exacerbated by clustering and lack-of-commitment problems mentioned in Lessons 1 and 2 above, but the extent of difficulties was still much greater than anyone expected.
LESSON

4: COST SAVINGS THROUGH OUTSOURCING ARE SURPRISINGLY HARD TO MEASURE AND MAY BE UNATTAINABLE
One of the government's primary objectives for IT Outsourcing Initiative was to save costs. Actually achieving cost savings proved to be harder than the government expected, and even knowing if they have been achieved or not is surprisingly difficult. It is rare to see audited details of cost savings discussed in public, which is why it is worth examining them now.
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Estimated non-discounted 12 cost savings for the three contracts analyzed in the Auditor-General's report, i.e., for agency Groups 3, 4, and 5, are shown in Table 2 . Baseline "estimated future costs from continued in-house operations" [OASITO 2000, page 21 ] are shown in row 1. OASITO estimates of cost savings at the time the tender documents were accepted are shown row 2. OASITO, of course, would have been under gentle political pressure to make these savings appear as high as possible. In particular, OASITA would have been conscious of the government's 1997 budget forecast of 15% cost savings [Costello 1997 ]. Table 2 . Estimated Non-Discounted Anticipated Cost Savings from IT Outsourcing for Groups 3, 4 and 5 at the time of selection of preferred tenderer Group 3 1997-98 Group 4 , and on the use of discounting of future cash flows. Since contract 12 Because the contracts run for five years, the ANAO report argues that costs should be discounted at 8%p.a. 13 Competitive-neutrality adjustments adjust reported savings to compensate for the fact that private outsourcing vendors are entitled to a return on capital and pay taxes that government departments do not pay. OASITO's estimate for Group 3 is before competitively-neutrality adjustments. Its estimates for Groups 4 and 5 are post competitively-neutrality adjustments.
(Phone call to Auditor-General's office, 12 Feb 2001). OASITO's figures before competitive neutrality adjustment for Groups 4 and 5 would appear to have been $60M and $1M respectively (ANAO 2000, Figure 1 ). The position taken in this paper is that return on vendor capital is a real cost of outsourcing that should not be ignored in computing cost savings. So the Auditor-The Australian Federal Government's Clustered-Agency IT Outsourcing Experiment by P. Seddon.
values are normally reported in the press in terms of the total non-discounted payments over the lives of the contracts, only non-discounted figures are reported in Table 2 .
The estimated cost savings in rows 2 and 3 do not reflect costs in agency senior management time for managing the transition or the costs incurred by OASITO in managing the tendering process. No data are available on senior management opportunity costs, but the costs incurred by OASITO appear to be about 3% of the value of contracts issued [ANAO 2000, para 19] . Using the Auditor-General's non-discounted figures and subtracting 3% for OASITO's costs, some crude estimates of expected cost savings at the times of contract approval are shown in row 6 of Table 2 . Based on the figures in Table 2 , the Group 3 contract looks like a winner, but Groups 4 and 5 are marginal propositions. Since the DEETYA 14 tender was cancelled due to lack of competitive tenders, it appears that even at the time of tender evaluation, three of four tenders were not likely to produce significant cost savings. Evidently it is not as easy to achieve cost savings through IT outsourcing as the government had been led to believe. ' -and Government's -dynamics." [ANAO 2000, para 8.26, p.187] Despite the measurement difficulties, the Government had framed its decision to outsource in terms of cost savings, so the question will always be asked: "Did the contract result in cost savings?" At the time of publication of the AuditorGeneral's report only one estimate of actual cost saving was available. The Cluster 3 contract management office (CMO), the cluster shown in Table 2 as the most likely to yield cost savings, had attempted to estimate cost savings for the first year of the Agreement, 1998 -99 [ANAO 2000 . Its estimates are discussed below. At the time of publication of the Auditor-General's report Cluster 4 was still awaiting data for estimating its first-year cost savings, and Cluster 5 had decided that "the process of measuring cost savings is unreliable" and "will not assist (and may distort) appropriate decision-making by contract managers and government" [ANAO 2000 paras 8.53-54] . A cynic might wonder if Cluster 5 management had some inkling of an outcome the government might prefer not to have quantified.
With respect to the only available estimate of realized cost savings, the Auditor- The savings model used in the tender evaluation to project first year savings included estimated voluntary redundancy (VR) payments and the payment to agencies by the ESP for existing equipment. The Cluster 3 CMO's analysis did not include these costs in either the normalised baseline or service charges considered. Taking those costs into consideration, the tender evaluation projected savings for the first year of the Agreement of 23 percent ($9.88m) for the agencies considered by the CMO. Including the equivalent items in the CMO's savings analysis results in first year savings realised across the Cluster of 13 percent of the normalised agency baseline ($6.7 million). A significant factor in the variance from expected savings is that actual DIMA VR payments were 3.5 times the $1 million estimate used in the evaluation. 198 IP Australia was projected to accrue savings of $220,000 (34 percent) in year one, but realised a cost premium of $209,000 (24 percent) over the normalised baseline. This was primarily due to an error in the tender evaluation which understated mainframe costs under outsourcing. IP Australia represents less than 3 percent of projected mainframe service charges over the term. Identified savings for AEC were greater than anticipated, partly due to a delay in the rollout of its desktop upgrade.
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The Australian Federal Government's Clustered-Agency IT Outsourcing Experiment by P. Seddon. what should be measured and how it should be measured, there is unlikely to be agreement on projected cost savings even on the date the tender is accepted.
Thereafter, conditions change, and controlling for the effect of these changes makes it even harder to estimate cost savings. Measurement difficulties aside, actually achieving cost savings is also difficult. Table 2 shows that even in a competitive tendering situation, significant cost savings from IT Outsourcing seemed likely in only one of four tenders. Clearly, despite the enormous effort that went into the Australian Federal Government's Initiative, cost savings do not automatically flow from IT outsourcing. This conclusion was reached many times before (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998 ], but it is rare to see the conclusion backed by such explicit, audited figures.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Reading the various reports referenced in this paper it is clear that the Australian Federal Government's objectives in its IT Outsourcing Initiative were motivated by the most laudable objectives. The government sought to achieve the best value for money its information technology dollar and to support growth of smaller Australian-owned IT service providers. To ensure success, it paid "top dollar" to obtain advice from some of the world's most respected and experienced advisors, and at the most senior level, it tried its hardest to make the project succeed. The novel aspect of the Initiative was the decision to cluster departments to achieve economies of scale. A second key aspect of the Initiative was the decision to impose IT outsourcing from above, often, it seems, against the better judgment of senior management of the agencies and individual agency staff.
So did the Initiative succeed? If the Initiative had been defined from the outset as an experiment it could be classified as a success: experiments aim to achieve learning, and an awful lot of learning took place. In particular, the government learnt that because of increased coordination costs, clusters do not produce the expected economies of scale for whole-of-IT outsourcing. Secondly, the government learnt that getting people on-side matters: all the way from senior management to the lowliest Help Desk worker. Third, the government learnt something that its advisors should already have known: that massive organizational change such as making the transition from insourcing to total outsourcing is hard. And finally, the government learnt that cost savings from total outsourcing are both hard to achieve and hard to measure. Lessons 2, 3, and 4 were learnt before, but somehow they had to be learnt again by both the Australian government and all its high-paid advisors.
However, the Australian federal government did not view the Initiative as an experiment; they simply wanted to acquire IT services more cheaply. perspective, the Initiative was a failure: centrally-coordinated clustered-agency IT did not work as well as expected. Five of eleven planned contracts worth a total of A$1.2 billion over five years are now let, and the agencies involved will have to live with (or renegotiate) these contracts in the coming years.
How did the theory, the ten commandments presented in the Introduction, stand up? A case study cannot "prove" the truth of any theory but contradictory evidence can raise serious doubt about the generality of a theory. In case of the three outsourcing contracts investigated in this paper, none of the evidence invalidates any of the commandments. Against the advice of Commandments 1 and 3, the government embarked on total IT outsourcing. It failed. Total outsourcing was abandoned. Against the advice of Commandment 2, the government sought to outsource all IT service provision rather than retain key IT staff to manage relationships with vendors. This action placed enormous strain on senior agency managers who, in the absence of qualified staff, were forced to become involved in micro-level IT management issues. Against the advice of Commandment 4, the government sought to impose IT outsourcing from above rather than letting senior managers in the different agencies choose to outsource services where they believed the economic case made sense. It was an article of faith that private-sector IT service provision would be more efficient than anything government public servants could provide. This action also failed.
Individual agencies are now given authority to exercise their own discretion on which services are to be outsourced and which are not. These four high-level decisions, and the underlying "privatization is good" ideology driving them, more or less set the stage for all that followed. 
